The large spread of sensors and smart devices in urban infrastructures are motivating research in the area of the Internet of Things (IoT) to develop new services and improve citizens' quality of life. Sensors and smart devices generate large amounts of measurement data from sensing the environment, which is used to enable services such as control of power consumption or traffic density. To deal with such a large amount of information and provide accurate measurements, service providers can adopt information fusion, which given the decentralized nature of urban deployments can be performed by means of consensus algorithms. These algorithms allow distributed agents to (iteratively) compute linear functions on the exchanged data, and take decisions based on the outcome, without the need for the support of a central entity. However, the use of consensus algorithms raises several security concerns, especially when private or security critical information is involved in the computation.
step can decrypt. To the best of our knowledge, ODIN is the first protocol that uses obfuscation and proxy re-encryption for the implementation of a secure multiparty computation protocol.
ODIN is secure in the semihonest model with noncolluding nodes. Every node in the network can be interested in observing other agents' information but does not deviate from the protocol for this purpose. Despite its simplicity, designing and evaluating the performance of protocols in the semihonest model is a first stepping stone toward protocols with stronger security guarantees for IoT device coordination in a distributed and decentralized setting. Moreover, we underline that the semihonest model applies to existing relevant IoT use cases, such as in privacy-preserving techniques for smart metering systems [22, 28] .
We finally underline that despite operating on blinded values, the ODIN algorithm is able to reach the same final binary decision of the equivalent plain gossip algorithm without errors and without disclosing the final consensus to the agents involved. Previous solutions, such as those of Braca et al. [15] , are only able to reach an approximated consensus or provide a public consensus from obfuscated inputs under specific assumptions. The only error introduced by the protocol is due to the quantization necessary to represent inputs as a ratio, which can be made as little as desired.
Related works. In the realm of distributed consensus, some privacy-preserving approaches have been recently proposed. Many of them [15, 32, 52] propose solutions that protect the measures in consensus networks by introducing in the first step a random noise that decreases during the protocol so that a consensus close to the correct one is reached. Other works in privacy-preserving data fusion were addressed in Roughan and Arnold [59, 60] . In these works, the authors use additive blinding or secret sharing to estimate the position of one or more targets by computing the average of the measurements of multiple sensors. The final result is not affected by noise, but the aforementioned works require that agents are connected through a well-defined path starting and finishing at each agent, and passing through all agents, such as in a ring network.
A first step toward a privacy-preserving implementation of the consensus algorithm has been proposed in Lazzeretti et al. [46] , where the authors approach the sensor fusion problem by using the popular iterative gossip consensus protocol [14, 23] in the encrypted domain. In each step, measures from two adjacent agents are updated by relying on an expensive homomorphic encryption protocol [55] that after any update step outputs the state of each node encrypted with the public key of all adjacent nodes, permitting a node to continue the computation with any other neighbor. Such a solution presents two main concerns. First, the computation and communication complexity linearly depends on the number of adjacent nodes of the agents i and j involved in the computation. This can be acceptable only in sparse scenarios, where each sensor has few neighbor nodes. Analogously, the complexity of the protocol could be very high in dense networks, such as in urban environments. Second, the protocol can be applied only to static networks (application to dynamic networks implies some changes that make the complexity for each update linear with the total number of nodes, i.e., impractical in large urban networks).
PRELIMINARIES
This section presents the main cryptographic tools that are used in ODIN. We first introduce additive blinding, a simple cryptographic protocol that is used in the update step. Next, we present proxy re-encryption, used to interface the two following update steps where different agents are involved. Finally, we present the GC, which we use in the final decision step.
Additive Blinding and Data Representation
The simplest way to protect data provided by one party to another one is through blinding (sometimes referred to as obfuscation or masking). We say that a blinding y = ax + b preserves the meaning of a functionality f (x ) if a corresponding operation д(y) exists such that f (x ) = α (a, b)д(y) + β (a, b)x + γ (a, b), where α, β, γ are arbitrary functions of a, b. The idea is that a party can evaluate a function f on a blinded value so that the party that blinded the output can remove blinding from the output of д.
In simple additive blinding, a user i masks his value x by adding a random value b and transmits x + b to another party. The receiver is not able to obtain x, but whoever knows b can retrieve x. To make this scheme really secure, some assumptions must be made on the representation of x and b. If the input x is a floating point number, b cannot be generated uniformly in the set of all possible floating point numbers, because their sum can cause the loss of many significant digits of x, when b x. For this reason, it is preferable to represent each input value as an integer number obtained by quantization-for instance, given an amplification factor K (usually a power of 2), x is mapped in the integer value x = K · x . At this point, additive blinding is performed by using integer numbers. We underline that it is also possible to approximate a value to a close rational number and then represent each value X as a ratio num/den between an integer numerator num and an integer denominator den, which can be represented in Z n . In this article, we both amplify input values and represent them as a ratio where at the beginning den = 1.
To achieve perfect secrecy, additive blinding must be performed by using modular arithmetic, as in a one-time pad. Assuming that x ∈ Z n , additive blinding is secure if b is uniformly chosen in Z n . However, for efficiency reasons, given the bit length necessary to represent any possible input x to the protocol, in many privacy-preserving protocols [7, 45, 47] , b is often chosen in Z 2 +t according to a uniform distribution [10] , where t is a number of bits sufficiently large to statistically guarantee low information leakage (usually t = 80).
Additive blinding is commonly used in hybrid protocols, as described in [40] , to permit efficient evaluation of complex functions for which solutions based on a single cryptographic tool would be inefficient (or even impossible). Being addition efficient in both secure multiparty computation protocols and homomorphic protocols, the interface between different cryptographic protocols is performed by using additive blinding. Random values are added by a cryptographic protocol, and the obfuscated value is then disclosed and used as input to the following cryptographic protocol that will remove the obfuscation. Several hybrid protocols working on homomorphic encryption and GCs have been proposed for privacy-preserving biometric authentication [6, 11] , biomedical applications [7, 45] , private function evaluation [47] , and so forth. Similarly, the implementation of a secure multiparty consensus gossip algorithm in Lazzeretti and Barni [46] relies on homomorphic encryption and GCs.
Proxy Re-Encryption
Proxy re-encryption allows a semitrusted proxy to convert a ciphertext, computed under the public key of a party, into a ciphertext that can be opened by using the secret key of another party without seeing the underlying plaintext. Proxy re-encryption has many applications (secure network file storage [5, 73] , email forwarding [4] , digital rights management [65] , or secure mailing lists [39] . In this article, we use proxy re-encryption to allow a node of the consensus network (the recipient) to decrypt values encrypted under the public key of another node (the sender) so that (1) the node in the middle (the proxy) cannot decrypt the message and (2) the sender does not know the recipient, which is chosen by the proxy.
A proxy re-encryption scheme is a tuple of (possibly probabilistic) polynomial time algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, ReEncGen, ReEnc), where KeyGen, Enc, Dec are standard key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms for the underlying cryptosystem, ReEncGen is the algorithm for the generation of the re-encryption keys, and ReEnc converts a ciphertext for a party into a ciphertext for another party.
Among many interesting proxy re-encryption protocols, such as Canetti and Hohenberger [19] , Chow et al. [20] , and Libert and Vergnaud [49] (and many others), we focus on the one proposed in Ateniese et al. [5] because it (1) it guarantees indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (CPAs), which presumes that an attacker can obtain the ciphertexts for arbitrary plaintexts without gaining any advantage (guaranteed by the probabilistic component of the encryption scheme); (2) is unidirectional (i.e., the delegation of a user A to another user B does not allow re-encryption from B to A); (3) is nontransitive, in which the proxy cannot construct a re-encryption key π A→C from the two keys π A→B and π B→C ; (4) is noninteractive (i.e., a user A cannot construct a re-encryption key π A→B without the participation of B or of the private key generator); and (5) is space optimal (i.e., additional communication costs are not needed to support re-encryption, as the scheme does not cause ciphertext expansion upon re-encryption and the size of B's secret storage remains constant, regardless of how many delegations he accepts).
To be self-contained in the description of our protocol, we now briefly recall the construction in Ateniese et al. [5] . The scheme operates over two groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order q with a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 [13, 37] . The system parameters are random generators д ∈ G 1 and Z = e (д, д) ∈ G 2 . The scheme is defined as follows:
-Key generation (KeyGen): The algorithm outputs a key pair (pk A , sk A ) for a user A of the form pk A = (Z a 1 , д a 2 ) and sk A = (a 1 , a 2 ). -Re-encryption key generation (ReEncGen): The algorithm permits user A to generate a re-encryption key π A→B for a user B,
To encrypt a message m ∈ G 2 under pk A in such a way that only the holder of sk A can decrypt it, the algorithm outputs
, where k is a random value; to encrypt a message m ∈ G 2 under pk A in such a way it can be decrypted by A and her delegatees (after having performed proxy re-encryption), the algorithm outputs 
Garbled Circuit
First proposed in the seminal work of Yao [70, 71] , GC protocols allow two parties to jointly evaluate any Boolean circuit, on their respective inputs, while protecting them from each other. Communication and computational overhead of such protocols depend on input bit length and circuit size. As outlined in Kolesnikov et al. [40] and Lazzeretti and Barni [44] , a GC protocol comprises three subroutines: circuit garbling, data exchange, and evaluation ( Figure 2) . At a high level, a GC protocol works as follows. First, a party, say Bob, creates a Boolean circuit, which represents the final function to be (securely) computed. Then, Bob "garbles" gates and wires composing the circuit, and transmits the GC, together with the secrets relative to his inputs, to another party, say Alice. The latter obtains secrets associated to her inputs from Bob through an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol [29] and evaluates the GC to obtain the final result. 
SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a network of devices, which we formally describe as an undirected graph G, whose vertices are the agents (or nodes) and edges are the available communication links, and hence each node i in G can communicate only with nodes in the set of his neighbors N i ⊆ [1, 2, . . . , N ]. Furthermore, we denote the adjacency matrix associated to the network graph as A, with {A} i j = 1 if j ∈ N i , and {A} i j = 0 otherwise. We assume that j ∈ N i if and only if i ∈ N j ; as a result, A is symmetric (i.e., A = A T ). Note that in dynamic networks, the set of neighbors N i (τ ) of a generic agent i may change over time and therefore also the adjacency matrix A(τ ). To simplify the exposition, in what follows, we consider a static network setting. However, the protocol described in Section 4 can be applied to dynamic networks.
Using the adjacency matrix, we define a random averaging consensus matrix W(τ ), at time τ ; agents update their state y(τ ), based on their previous state y(τ − 1), and on W(τ ), according to the iterative rule: y(τ ) = W(τ )y(τ − 1), where the initial state is given by the local measures
T . The consensus procedure has interesting properties. In particular, under mild conditions (e.g., low connectivity of the network graph), the convergence is guaranteed to the average of the initial values (i.e., lim τ →inf
. . , N (see details in Boyd et al. [14] and OlfatiSaber et al. [54] )). After a given number of steps T , each agent is interested in computing the binary statistical decision D i (T ) ∈ {H 0 , H 1 } given by the test y i (T ) For simplicity, this work focuses on the randomized gossip algorithm [14, 23] where at each consensus step τ a pair of adjacent nodes, say agents i and j, is randomly selected according to the network graph to perform an update. Figure 3 shows a possible sequence of update steps in a consensus network. For ease of exposition, in the remainder of this article we will describe consensus as a sequence of consecutive update steps. However, in real-world applications, this solution would be almost unpractical, as it would need a third-party supervising entity that chooses which nodes will participate in subsequent update steps. Nevertheless, here we use this model to simply model real scenarios where each agent, after having finished an update step, waits for a (random) time and then contacts an adjacent agent for the next update, as shown in Figure 4 . Two or more updates between two couples of distinct agents can thus run in parallel, but they are seen as being performed in sequence in the model. For a real implementation to succeed, two agents must not start an update if at least one of the two is still involved in another update. Moreover, after agents i and j have performed an update, we avoid that they start another useless update together until one of them has updated his status with a third agent. Finally, we consider that agent strategies related to the choice of the waiting time between two updates, and the choice of the node to communicate with, are outside the scope of this article.
The agents involved in step τ exchange their information and update their states by the averaging rule [14] ,
whereas the other agents hold their previous value
Note that as outlined in Section 2.1, we work with integer numbers. We represent each agent state y i as a ratio between a numerator n i and a denominator d i . In this way, we avoid division, which would cause a loss of information. Hence, given
and having computed the least common multiplier lcm(τ − 1) between d i (τ − 1) and d j (τ − 1), agents update their state by computing
We underline that the numerator carries information related to the inputs, but the denominator only depends on the number of steps performed; therefore, it is not necessary to keep it secret. Moreover, since d i (0) = 1 ∀i, lcm(0) = 1 and d i (1) = 2. During the computation, one can easily infer that d i (τ − 1) are powers of 2 ∀i, τ , 4 and then as a consequence each least common multiplier can be computed as
In the final step T , each agent i evaluates the comparison with his threshold thr i , with the help of an adjacent agent. The choice of when to perform the final step (after a given interval from the protocol starts, a given number of updates, etc.) is outside the scope of this article.
Security model. Throughout the article, we consider noncolluding agents operating in the semihonest security model. In practice, all parties involved follow the protocol without deviating from it but try to infer as much as possible from their observations without interacting with other agents, except for the operations described in the protocol. We consider protection against external (network) adversaries outside the scope of this work. We do not consider attacks such as message manipulation or fake message injection, which target message integrity and authenticity. However, each device could make use of shared or pairwise keys and apply signatures or message authentication codes (e.g., HMAC) to protect against such attacks.
ODIN: OUR PRIVACY-PRESERVING CONSENSUS PROTOCOL
In what follows, we present the details of ODIN, our novel solution for privacy-preserving decentralized consensus. Before proceeding with the description of our proposal, we highlight that ODIN presents a completely innovative algorithm with respect to Lazzeretti et al. [46] , which shares with ODIN only a system model and protocol goals. In fact, ODIN replaces homomorphic encryption with simple additive blinding, reducing the complexity of the protocol operations but still guaranteeing that nodes do not have access to any plain numerators (except their own inputs at τ = 0). Moreover, by using proxy re-encryption, agents are able to operate in further steps with other nodes with constant communication and computation complexity, as we show in Section 5.2.
ODIN comprises three main phases: a setup phase (Section 4.1), which has the purpose of generating all parameters to configure the consensus network; an update phase (Section 4.2), which involves the computation of multiple status update steps between pairs of agents in the network; and a decision phase (Section 4.3), which allows each agent in the network to reach a decision in a privacy-preserving way.
Setup Phase
We assume that each node i in the network owns a proxy re-encryption key pair pk i , sk i , public and secret, respectively. Each agent propagates its public key, and other public keys it received, together with some additional information identifying the owner node, to all adjacent nodes until each node gets the public keys of all nodes in the network. Once all public keys are obtained, each node i generates all re-encryption keys π i→j ∀j ∈ N , j i and distributes to any adjacent node j the re-encryption keys π i→k ∀k ∈ N j , k i. In a dynamic network, agent i provides re-encryption keys to any other node in the network to each neighbor and shares re-encryption keys through the network to nonadjacent nodes, encrypted with the public keys of the recipients. Whether or not a new agent joins the network, the whole network needs to be updated by sharing his public key and generating and distributing all re-encryption keys to and from him.
The procedure can be simplified if a semihonest third party participates in the setup phase, taking care of the distribution of public and re-encryption keys. In the case where a trusted party is available, he can generate all public, secret, and re-encryption keys and then distribute them to the network.
Update Phase
Without loss of generality, we now describe the protocol implementing a generic update phase in the model described in Section 3 (i.e., without considering the parallelization of update steps). Thus, we consider a generic update step τ , shown in Figure 5 , which involves two agents, i and j; we further assume that at time τ − 1, i and j performed their previous status updates with nodes k and l, respectively.
At the beginning of step τ , agent i owns n i (τ − 1) + s k (τ − 1)-that is, his numerator obfuscated by a random value 5 generated by node k, the denominator d i (τ − 1), and the encryption [s k (τ − 1)] k of the random value chosen by k using the public key pk k . Similarly, agent j owns Step τ of ODIN's update phase involving agents i and j. We assume that i and j previously updated their status with two different agents, k and l, respectively. All operations are performed in Z N . Outputs of other agents at step τ are equal to their own inputs.
, and d j (τ )-that is, updated numerators obfuscated by random values chosen by the other node, the encryption of such obfuscating values, and the plain updated denominator. Any other agent h ∀h ∈ N , h i, j simply sets the new status equal to the previous one. Note that in the case where agent i (or similarly j) has not yet updated his status, he inputs n i (τ − 1) = y i (0) and d i (τ − 1) = 1. The following protocol can be simply adapted by considering the masking value s k (τ − 1) = 0. We describe the activities carried out by agent i. Note that we can obtain the protocol executed by agent j by simply replacing, in the following description, indexes i, j, k, and l with j, i, l, and k, respectively. Part 1 . In the first part of the protocol, agents add a new obfuscation to their numerator and transform the previous obfuscating value in a ciphertext that the other node can decrypt and remove. In the detail, agent i generates two new random independent and identically distributed values r i (τ ) and s i (τ ) in Z n , where n must be equal or lower than the order q of the proxy reencryption scheme. The value r i (τ ) is used to add an additional mask to the numerator, obtaining
At this point agent i transmits
Part 2 . Agents first remove obfuscation introduced by other nodes and then update the numerator under obfuscation. Agent i decrypts the first-level ciphertext [[s l (τ − 1)]] i by using his secret key and subtracts it by the numerator received, obtaining n j (τ − 1) + r j (τ ) mod n, yet obfuscated by the random value chosen by agent j. Then it computes the least common multiplier lcm(τ − 1) between his denominator and the one received by agent j. Considering that denominators are always powers of 2, the least common denominator is computed as in Equation (3) and is used to update the numerator and denominator. Agent i computes a numerator obfuscated by a term ob f j (τ ) depending on the values r j (τ ) and s k (τ − 1), and on other public information. We remind the reader that such values are accessible only to agent j and not to i, because generated or decrypted by j in previous part. Considering that n i (τ ) = n j (τ ) and that agent i cannot remove the obfuscation currently applied to the numerator, at the end of this part the obfuscated numerator computed by i is provided to agent j for obfuscation removal and vice versa.
Moreover, to prevent agent j from obtaining the plain numerator n j (τ ) after having removed ob f j (τ ), agent i adds the random value s i (τ ). The updated and obfuscated numerator is computed as
where we can easily observe that
and
are integer numbers (powers of 2, and at least one of them is equal to 1), whereas ob f j (τ ) is composed by terms that agent j knows. At this point, agent i computes the denominator d i (τ ) as d i (τ ) = 2 lcm(τ ) and computes the second-level encryption of s i (τ ) with his public key, as [s i (τ )] i = Enc 2 (s i (τ ), pk i ), allowing future re-encryption.
The obfuscated numerator n j (τ ) + ob f j (τ ) + s i (τ ) and the encrypted random value [s i (τ )] i are transmitted to agent j, whereas agent i receives
Part 3 . Finally, agents remove the obfuscation depending on the values they know, whereas the obfuscation added in the second part prevents them from obtaining the plain value. Agent i computes ob f i (τ ) = s l (τ − 1)
mod n and removes it from the obfuscated numerator received by agent j, obtaining n i (τ ) + s j (τ ) mod n.
The output of Part 3 , together with the ciphertext received during the second phase of the protocol, and the computed denominator, will be used in the following updates, where agent i (respectively, agent j) will be involved.
Variant with data size reduction. Considering that the measures y i (0) are represented as the couple n i (0), d i (0) (where the first one is represented with bits and d i (0) = 1, and that after each step the ratio n i (τ )/d i (τ ) represents an estimation of the average of all the sensors' measures, then n i (τ ) can be represented by using a number of bits equal to plus log 2 d i (τ ) = log 2 lcm(τ − 1) + 1 ≤ τ . If the protocol runs for a large number of steps, there is the risk that n i (τ ) exceeds the modulus n. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the numerator bit size by dividing it (and also the denominator) by a given factor 2 k when the bit length exceeds a previously established + 1 (a discussion is provided later in the section). This can be easily performed by modifying the protocol of step τ .
After
, agents i and j decide to perform the data size reduction. For simplicity, we describe only the operations performed by agent i; agent j follows the same protocol in parallel. Given the upper bound of the numerator max(n i (τ )) = max(n j (τ )) = 2 + 1 and given the statistical security parameter t (usually t = 80) used to guarantee statistic security, agent i randomly selects s i (τ ) in Z 2 + 1 +t −k , instead from Z n , and right appends k zero bits to it, obtaining (4), removes it from the numerator, and divides it by 2 k (discards the k least significant bits), obtaining
(i.e., the updated numerator, blinded exactly by the value s j (τ ), received encrypted). The protocol works correctly whether n i (τ ) + s j (τ ) < n (it does not exceed the modulus n), so the protocol performs an integer division, not a modulus division. Given that max(n i (τ )) = 2 + 1 and s i (τ ) ∈ Z 2 + 1 +t , their sum representation needs + 1 + t + 1 bits and 1 must be chosen so that 1 < log 2 n − − t − 1.
As stated earlier, the modified update step of ODIN relies on statistical secrecy, where one party can deduce the value n i (τ ) with probability 2 −t . Moreover, the k least significant bits (discarded by the division) are revealed to agents. If higher security is desired, it is possible to use the less efficient protocols described in Lazzeretti and Barni [43] and Veugen [67] , involving homomorphic encryption or GCs.
Decision Phase
The final goal of an agent i is to discover whether the value obtained by the consensus protocol is greater than a given threshold thr i . Let us suppose that at step T , agent i has just updated his state together with agent j and is interested in evaluating n i (T )/d i (T ) thr i . For simplicity, in what follows, we consider < (note that this does not affect the overall protocol complexity). Since agent i knows d i (T ) and n i (T ) + s j (T ), he can evaluate together with agent j a GC implementing
where agent i inputs n i (T ) + s j (T ) and thr i * d i (T ) (computed in the plain domain), whereas agent j inputs s j (T ). The circuit first removes the obfuscation s j (T ) and then compares the numerator with thr i * d i (T ). If agent j is also interested in evaluating the comparison with his threshold thr j , it is not necessary that a second circuit is evaluated, but the preceding GC can be modified so that it also evaluates n i (T ) < thr j * d j (T ), where
Despite its simplicity, the preceding circuit will have some associated complexity, because the evaluation of the modular difference with GCs is expensive. Its implementation requires a subtractor that can return a negative result, to which n is added if the difference is negative. The circuit is hence composed by a subtractor implementing the first operation, an adder that adds n, and finally a multiplexer that selects among their results, according to the carry bit of the first operation. Considering that all operations involve values represented with log 2 n bits, and that adders, subtractors, and multiplexers require a non-XOR gate for each input bit [41] , we can easily observe that we would need to evaluate 3 log 2 n non-XOR gates. However, to make the circuit efficient, it is sufficient that during the previous update step, agent j generates s j (T ) in Z 2 +log 2 d i (T )+t instead of in Z n , relying on statistical security. In such a way, n i (T ) + s j (T ) < n and GC needs only an integer subtractor that removes the obfuscation with only + log 2 d i (T ) non-XOR gates. The final comparison is computed among two values, each of them represented with + log 2 d i (T ) bits.
ANALYSIS
We now briefly discuss the convergence (Section 5.1), complexity (Section 5.2), and security (Section 5.3) of ODIN.
Convergence
A commonly accepted choice of T can be based on the concept of ϵ-averaging time [14] -for instance, the earliest gossip time in which the state vector y(τ ) is ϵ away from the normalized true average with probability greater than 1 − ϵ. A sufficiently small ϵ, which guarantees that all agents make the same decision with high probability, requires an average timeT (ϵ ) ≤ 3 log ϵ −1 log λ 2 (EW) −1 , in terms of update steps, where E [W] is the expected value operator of randomly selected averaging matrices W (t ) and λ 2 (EW) is its second largest eigenvalue.
As demonstrated in Dimakis et al. [23] , the topology of the network influences the consensus convergence, and indeed the matrix E [W] is completely specified by the network topology and the consensus protocol. Given that the average time needed for the convergence does not depend on the starting values provided by nodes, it is possible to estimate when the nodes have reached the consensus even without observing the exchanged messages as in the ODIN algorithm. We further stress that ODIN only adds a privacy layer on top of the gossip protocol and does not interfere with the properties of the consensus algorithm. For efficiency reasons, a wide part of the consensus literature is focused on how the consensus protocol (choice of consensus matrices) and the network topology can speed up the convergence. For instance, in Boyd et al. [14] , λ 2 (EW) is minimized subject to the topology and the pairwise nature of the consensus protocol.
Complexity Analysis
In what follows, we discuss computational and communication complexity of the update step of ODIN introduced in Section 4.2, focusing on a generic step τ , and of the final decision phase introduced in Section 4.3.
Step τ complexity. Following the description of step τ in Section 4, we observe that agent i performs a modular addition to add r i (τ ) to the numerator; performs a proxy re-encryption on the value [s k (τ − 1)] k ; transmits the masked numerator ( log 2 n bits), the denominator (log 2 d i (τ − 1) < log 2 n bits), and one ciphertext to j while receiving masked ciphertexts, the denominator, and one ciphertext from him, with similar communication complexity; then he performs first-level decryption of the received ciphertext by using PrK i ; removes the obtained masked value with a modular subtraction and then evaluates Equation (4), which requires a modular product (one or both
d j (τ −1) are equal to 1) and two modular additions; encrypts s i (τ ) with its public key PuK i ; transmits one ciphertext and the masked numerator ( log 2 n bits) to j while receiving one ciphertext and the masked numerator from j; he then computes ob f i (τ ) with a modular product and a modular addition; and he finally removes it from the masked numerator with another modular addition.
In total, agent i (and also agent j) performs two modular products, six modular additions, one reencryption, one first-level encryption, and one second-level encryption. The complexity of secondlevel encryption and first-level decryption in Ateniese et al. [5] mainly depends on two modular exponentiations and one modular exponentiation, respectively, whereas re-encryption requires a pairing operation. From a communication point of view, the two agents involved in the computation in step k transmit four ciphertexts, four modular numbers, and two integer numbers with variable size in two communication rounds. Ciphertexts are composed by two messages of prime order q; practical implementations of bilinear maps use elliptic curves for G 1 , and elements in Z q 2 for G 2 , and hence ciphertext representation needs 4 log 2 q bits. 
The complexity of step τ with data size reduction is similar because it needs only two additional integer divisions for each agent. However, they have negligible complexity, because they are performed by simply discarding the least significant k bits.
Step t complexities are summarized in Table 1 , where modular addition (having negligible complexity respect to other operations) is overlooked.
Decision step complexity. The complexity of ODIN's final decision step mainly depends on the use of a GC, which in turn depends on the number of its non-XOR gates composing the circuit. Each non-XOR gate has an associated garbled table, whose garbling and evaluation are performed by using three and one hash functions, respectively (four for each non-XOR gate in total) [40] . Garbled tables have size 3t bits each, where t is a security parameter (usually t = 80 bits), and are transmitted from the garbler to the evaluator. XOR gates have negligible computational and communication complexity. Secrets associated with the garbler's input bits (t bits each) are transmitted from the garbler to the evaluator after having associated them to the input bits. Evaluator secret transmission involves OT, which associates the input bits to secrets chosen by the circuit garbler. Considering that OT can be precomputed [9] , many OTs can be evaluated offline on random values (regardless of the actual values used during the circuit evaluation), and resulting in a lower online communication complexity, only approximately 2t bits for each input bit. Offline OT can be performed before the protocol starts or while two adjacent nodes wait to perform the next update step. Therefore, the complexity of this "offline" calculation is not considered here.
We assume that in the final step agents i and j are evaluating together the GC and that both of them are interested in obtaining the result of the comparison between the numerator and their respective thresholds. Both of the two inputs values are represented with + log 2 d (T ) < log 2 n bits (only the least + log 2 d (T ) bits of n i (T ) + s j (T ) and s j (T ) are necessary to remove the obfuscation, in the worst case log 2 n bits). Hence, the association of the evaluator (e.g., agent i) inputs to secret values through OT requires the transmission of 2( + log 2 d (T ) )(2t ) bits, whereas the garbler (e.g., agent j) transmits the secrets associated to its input (i.e., 2( + log 2 d (T ) )t bits). The circuit is composed of a subtracter and two comparison circuits, both having + log 2 d (T ) non-XOR gates, and hence 3( + log 2 d (T ) )3t bits are transmitted for the circuit and 4 × 3( + log 2 d (T ) ) hash functions are evaluated in total. Complexities of ODIN's final step are summarized in Table 1 .
Note that the overall complexity of ODIN is significantly less than the one in Lazzeretti et al. [46] , which requires 2(|N i | + |N j |) + 8 modular exponentiations and (|N i | + |N j | + 2) homomorphic ciphertexts to be transmitted, where N i (respectively, N j ) is the number of nodes adjacent to agent i (respectively, j). This makes ODIN really efficient, especially because its computational complexity is independent from the number of adjacent nodes (a real bottleneck in dense networks) and is not affected by the dynamicity of the network. However, the space complexity of ODIN is slightly bigger than the one in Lazzeretti et al. [46] due to the need for each agent to store not only the N public keys of all nodes but also the re-encryption keys between other nodes (i.e. (N − 1)(N − 2) re-encryption keys). But memory space can be provided at low cost, and this does not affect the power consumption. Furthermore, space complexity can be reduced in static networks by storing in each agent only the re-encryption keys among its adjacent nodes.
Security Discussion
Before discussing the security of ODIN, we briefly recall the security of its building blocks:
-Proxy re-encryption: The security of the proxy re-encryption scheme in Ateniese et al. [5] relies on an extension of the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption [13] . -Garbled circuit: Standard GC construction and execution using a secure OT protocol [9] are secure in the semihonest model, as demonstrated in the multiple existing constructions and proofs in the literature (e.g., Lindell and Pinkas [51] . -Additive blinding: Additive blinding is secure in an information-theoretical sense [10] . The masked message y = x + r (i.e., the ciphertext) would provide no information about the original message x to a cryptanalyst with infinite computational power when the mutual information [21] between ciphertext and plaintext is I (x; y) = 0 [63] . When our protocol performs modular operations in Z n and any r is independent and identically distributed in Z n , additive blinding implements the Vernam system (also named one-time pad) [66] , which guarantees perfect secrecy. Considering that x ∈ [0, M x ], if additive blinding is performed choosing r independently and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, M r ], with M x + M r < n, a statistical blinding y = x + r , where has mutual information
In the ODIN scenario, a (noncolluding) PPT adversary A, in the semihonest model, has the goal of disclosing his input and output values, and the ones of other nodes with which he interacts. We formalize this goal as a security experiment Exp A between the adversary agent A, the current (honest) agent j interacting with A, and the previous agent k who interacted with A. In this experiment, A interacts with j using ODIN (Section 4), and after a polynomial number of steps outputs one or more of the values <ŝ k (τ − 1),ŝ j (τ ),r j (τ ) >, which can be used to infer some input/output of the protocols.
We define the notion of security for a privacy-preserving consensus algorithm as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Security of a Privacy-preserving Consensus Algorithm).
A privacy-preserving consensus algorithm is said to be secure in the semihonest model, and in presence of a noncolluding Proof (Sketch) of Theorem 5.2. We start our proof sketch starting from the update phase of ODIN (Section 4.2), focusing on one update step. In this case, the goal of a (noncolluding) PPT adversary agent A = i is to disclose the values n i (τ − 1) = n k (τ − 1), n j (τ − 1), or n i (τ ) = n j (τ ). To do so, an adversary i that interacts with another (honest) agent j must obtain either s k (τ − 1), r j (τ ), or s j (τ ). To obtain s k (τ − 1) (respectively, s j (τ )), i can only try to (1) 
so that he can decrypt it using sk i , or (3) infer s k (τ − 1) (respectively, s j (τ ) or r j (τ )) from the observed messages.
To be able to achieve (1), excluding the possibility for i to obtain the secret key sk k of agent k (respectively, sk j ), given the noncolluding nodes assumption, i could only attack the proxy re-encryption scheme as follows: i selects several values x in the set of values admissible values for n i (τ − 1) (respectively, n i (τ )) and computes the encryption of (n i (τ − 1) + s k (τ − 1)) − x 6:16 M. Ambrosin et al. (respectively, (n i (τ ) + s j (τ )) − x); then, i checks whether the result is equal to the given input value [s k (τ − 1)] k (respectively, [s j (τ ))] j ). However, being proxy re-encryption scheme of Ateniese et al. [5] CPA secure (thanks to its probabilistic properties), this turns out to be computationally unfeasible for any PPT adversary (i.e., the probability of success is negligible in q ). Similarly, goal (2) is proven to be computationally unfeasible for a PPT adversary using the scheme in Ateniese et al. [5] . In fact, if the setup has been correctly run, i neither possesses π k→i or π j→i , nor he can generate them, due to the nontransitive and noninteractive properties of the proxy re-encryption scheme in Ateniese et al. [5] . Finally, a PPT adversary i cannot achieve goal (3) since s k (τ − 1), s j (τ ), and r j (τ ) are always added to a numerator (i.e., his final objective). Adversary i could try to remove numerators by performing some linear combination of the observed messages. However, we can easily see that any linear combination of messages contains the sum of at least two values unknown to i. We can easily infer that a PPT adversary i can try to decrypt numerators by picking random values <ŝ k (τ − 1),ŝ j (τ ),r j (τ ) >. However, they will be equal to < s k (τ − 1), s j (τ ), r j (τ ) > with negligible probability, and the attacker is not able to understand if this happens.
Note that, a similar analysis can be carried out to assert the security of step τ with data size reduction. In this case, we use statistical security, but having t = 80 guarantees a low mutual information between numerators and their relative ciphertexts.
Finally, the decision phase of ODIN (Section 4.3) can be considered secure, as it relies on both a GC protocol and additive blinding, which have been proven to be secure against a semihonest noncolluding PPT adversary.
PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we briefly present an evaluation of a proof-of-concept implementation of ODIN on commodity IoT devices to show its practicability. We run our implementation on a Raspberry Pi 1 Mod B equipped with a 700MHz ARM CPU and 512 MB RAM, and a more recent Raspberry Pi 3 equipped with a 1.2GHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 CPU and 1GB RAM ( Figure 6 ); both devices run Raspbian Jessie Lite OS with kernel v4.4. These devices represent a typical example of low cost (the latest model, Raspberry Pi mod 3, can be bought with < 35$ 6 ) and widespread IoT boards.
Our code relies on a proxy re-encryption library that implements the scheme in Ateniese et al. [5] , 7 which in turn is based on the MIRACL Cryptographic SDK. 8 We used the MIRACL library to implement the simple modular arithmetic operations performed in our protocol. We consider runtime performance, approximate energy consumption (obtained as the average power, which we measured with a USB Power Monitor V2 device shown in Figure 6 , multiplied by the execution To provide an estimate of the overall runtime and energy consumption of ODIN, we benchmarked the operations involving cryptographic primitives, which dominate the overall performance. Results are summarized in Table 2 . Apart from data transmissions, we estimate the runtime of one update step of ODIN, and of its variant with data size reduction, based on our complexity analysis in Section 5.2 and on the measurements in Table 2 . The overall runtime of the update step of ODIN is 111.66ms with an energy consumption of 241.19mJ, on a Raspberry Pi 1 Mod B; similarly, the runtime on a Raspberry Pi 3 can be approximated as 41.70ms with an energy consumption of 88.40mJ. We further run ODIN on both devices and benchmarked the update phase. The results of this evaluation are shown in Table 3 , divided into three parts. The variant with data size reduction in Section 4 shows a similar complexity, adding only two divisions. Note that as mentioned in Section 5.2, our divisions involve only powers of 2 (i.e., are performed by discarding less significant bits); this introduces a negligible complexity on the device, and therefore we did not consider it in our evaluation. Similarly, as computing lcm is merely a comparison between two big integers, we did not include it in our evaluation.
The final decision step of ODIN involves the evaluation of a GC, which, according to our complexity analysis in Section 5.2, in the worst case involves 3 × 4 × log 2 q operations (as + log 2 d (T ) < log 2 n ≤ log 2 q). Using a 256-bit representation for q, and considering SHA-1 as a cryptographic primitive, we can estimate the overall runtime as 25.80ms and the associated energy consumption as 55.73mJ on a Raspberry Pi 1 Mod B, and 19.05ms runtime and 40.39mJ energy consumption on a Raspberry Pi 3. Communication overhead. During one update step of ODIN (Section 4.2), each node generates messages of different sizes. In our prototype implementation, we performed message "serialization" leveraging the serialization routines provided by the MIRACL library, as well as from the proxy re-encryption library in use. The result is that in one update step of our protocol, nodes generate (and receive) messages of size 140B and 72B. These messages are quite small and can be efficiently exchanged even over channels with a low data rate. Note that the actual impact of such messages on the total transmission overhead highly depends on node deployment, the protocol in use, and the physical antenna used for wireless communication. As an example, we consider the use of 6lowPAN protocol, which provides an adaptation layer to allow the use of UDP and IPv6 on top of the 802.15.4 protocol, which is widely used in the IoT [33] . In the simplest case (i.e., where two devices have local link addresses as in our case), in a 127B frame we can use up to 108B of payload [34] . Therefore, sending the first message in the update step translates into sending two 127B frames, whereas the other messages simply fit into a single link layer frame. These results confirm the low impact that our approach has on the overall transmission cost, which makes it particularly suitable for low-power devices.
Simulation. For a better understanding of the feasibility of ODIN on large networks of IoT devices, similarly to Ambrosin et al. [2] and Asokan et al. [3] , we performed a set of simulations using OMNeT++. 9 In our simulations, we generated random networks of nodes of different size and density; nodes are placed randomly in an area of 100m 2 and connected to neighbors within a range of 10m through links simulating the IEEE 802.14.5 protocol (according to the parameters in Spanogiannopoulos et al. [64] ). We simulated the execution of ODIN on Raspberry Pi Mod 1 devices using delays (i.e., using the ones in Tables 2 and 3 ). We considered different values for ϵ, from 0.05 to 0.01 with steps of 0.01, and networks of size 400, 500, and 600. For each generated random topology, we computed the necessary number of iterations T to reach a consensus according to the results in Boyd et al. [14] (see Section 5.1). Table 4 shows the average number of needed steps and their standard deviation according to different configurations of number of nodes and ϵ. According to Figure 4 , each node randomly decides when to perform an update, and the protocol stops when each node has started a number of updates greater than T /N (i.e., the ratio between the needed number of steps and the network size). Figure 7 reports the running time of the protocol networks, averaged on 100 executions. Our simulation time includes the (simulated) execution time for ODIN procedures on devices, message transmission time on a ZigBee-like communication protocol (simulated by OMNeT++), and random delays between update steps of the same device. We can observe that on average, ODIN needs no more than 18 seconds in the networks generated. We note that as expected, runtime principally depends on ϵ, whereas it does not change significantly with the number of nodes, with the ratio T /N almost constant with the same ϵ. Our simulations show encouraging results, suggesting that a consensus can be reached even in large networks of hundreds of nodes in a small amount of time. 
CONCLUSIONS
This article proposes ODIN, an innovative mechanism to fuse private information through a secure extension of the consensus algorithm. ODIN is based on the randomized gossip algorithm, in which a pair of agents participate in data exchange in each time frame, and is secure against noncolluding semihonest nodes. We believe that our construction represents an important step toward the implementation of efficient and useful algorithms, able to make decisions based on the average consensus of private inputs. As demonstrated through practical tests, ODIN is also efficient on low-power devices, and IoT networks can reach the consensus in reasonable time, even without having access to plain values. This opens the way to its application in distributed and dynamic urban networks, and to the IoT in general. Tests have been performed in static networks to validate protocol performances but can easily be extended to dynamic networks. The duality between plain and privacy-preserving consensus networks guarantees that the secure implementation can reach the consensus as the plain implementation does, with a small delay. However, variation of the protocol should be studied to provide a privacy-preserving consensus, also in consensus networks with time varying state, where sensor observations change during the protocol evaluation.
We focused mainly on the consensus protocol, but particular attention should be also reserved for the setup phase. In Section 4.1, we simply sketched some ideas to be able to operate with dynamic networks where nodes can join or leave during the computation. In future research, it will be necessary to develop a strategy so that protocol can scale with large networks. In fact, in the current implementation, devices store all public and re-encryption keys of the other nodes to allow further computation. Given the memory limits of low-power devices, this is not always possible. A possible solution can rely on a dynamic management of keys where nodes exchange keys of other nodes that are in a given range, larger than the communication range, and with whom they will have higher probability to perform future updates. Despite this solution to overcome memoryrelated limits, it introduces communication and computation overhead.
Despite its simple security model, ODIN can already be applied to some IoT scenarios, such as smart metering systems. Future work has the goal of relaxing the "noncolluding" assumption to allow the use of privacy-preserving consensus protocols in a larger set of scenarios. In fact, if agents i and j collude, they can share s k (τ − 1) and s l (τ − 1), allowing them to obtain n i (τ − 1) and n j (τ − 1). Guaranteeing security and correctness against misbehaving nodes will be one of the most difficult steps in future research. We highlight that malicious nodes can modify the messages exchanged during step τ so that the network reaches a wrong consensus. This is a problem with a difficult solution also in the plain domain where some defense strategies have been proposed [48, 56, 57, 69, 72] . For this reason, the problem could have no efficient solution in privacy-preserving consensus networks, where exchanged messages cannot be distinguished from random values. However, the possibility to extend the protocol to malicious users deserves to be exploited. A possible solution can rely on proxy re-zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (proxy re-ZKP) schemes [12] . Another possible solution can be based on attestation protocols [25, 62] , where a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [24] inside the device verifies that the device is not compromised and is running the correct software. Unfortunately, this solution requires particular components not really common in low-power devices and adds computation and transmission costs.
Future work also includes the application to practical urban scenarios, such as smart meter data fusion, object tracking, or vehicle coordination, as well as the analysis of the impact of network topology to the performances of the secure consensus algorithm. In practical scenarios, many details neglected here must be considered, such as management of transmission collision and device energy control. We finally underline that the protocol could represent the basis for privacypreserving protocols in other relevant (non-IoT) domains. For example, it can be used to detect replicas in Big Data storage while protecting the privacy of users, to reduce content excess in networks that use information-centric networking protocols without disclosing the content of single caches, or to evaluate the quality of contents shared in peer-to-peer networks while protecting single user evaluations.
